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Discord

discord.com

C

Partial

Detection on public surfaces is credible and the operator files at volume with NCMEC. The gap is private space: server-scoped and direct messaging carry the bulk of documented harm, and the enforcement record shows removal outpacing any structural change to how adults reach minors.
Domain
discord.com
Category
Messaging
Last review
2026-04-11

Detection & scanning

Whether known and novel abuse material is found at all, and across which surfaces of the product.

B
1.01

Hash matching on publicly posted media

Hash matching is applied to media uploaded to public servers. [1]

Pass
1.02

Hash matching on private messages and attachments

Coverage of direct-message attachments is asserted but not specified. The operator has not stated whether matching runs on all DM media or only on reported content. [1] [2]

Neutral
1.03

Classifier detection of previously unseen material

A classifier for previously unseen material is described in published safety documentation. [1]

Pass
1.04

Detection applied to live and streamed video

Voice and video channels are not covered by the described media pipeline.

Neutral
1.05

Detection of grooming and solicitation in text

Grooming detection is claimed at the account-behaviour level. No published detection rate or evaluation.

Neutral
1.06

Participation in industry hash-sharing programmes

Participates in industry hash-sharing arrangements. [1]

Pass

Reporting & transparency

What the operator tells NCMEC, law enforcement and the public, and whether those disclosures can be checked.

C
2.01

Files CyberTipline reports to NCMEC

Files CyberTipline reports; volume is consistent with a platform of this scale. [3]

Pass
2.02

Publishes child-safety enforcement figures

A recurring transparency report separates child-safety enforcement from other categories. [1]

Pass
2.03

Report quality sufficient for investigation

No public assessment of report completeness by receiving agencies.

Neutral
2.04

Reporting cadence and timeliness

Reporting appears tied to review-queue completion rather than detection.

Neutral

Response & enforcement

What happens after material is found: how fast it comes down, what happens to the account, and whether the decision can be contested.

D
3.01

Time to removal of confirmed material

No removal-latency figure is published.

Neutral
3.02

Account termination on confirmed violation

Policy provides for termination on confirmed violation. [1]

Pass
3.03

Prevention of re-registration

Re-registration is documented repeatedly in reporting on the platform. Account creation requires only an email address. [2] [4]

Fail
3.04

Preservation of evidence

Preservation on legal request is described; retention absent a request is not stated.

Neutral
3.05

Escalation of imminent-harm cases

An emergency-disclosure path for imminent harm is documented. [1]

Pass

Product & policy posture

The design decisions that determine how much abuse is possible in the first place, before any detection is applied.

C
4.01

Protective defaults for minor accounts

Teen accounts carry restricted defaults. Defaults depend on a self-declared age. [1]

Neutral
4.02

Restrictions on adult-initiated contact with minors

Adults can initiate contact with minors through shared-server membership, which is the mechanism most often described in prosecutions. [2] [4]

Fail
4.03

Age assurance at registration

Age is self-declared at registration with no assurance step.

Fail
4.04

Recommendation systems assessed for minor-safety harm

Server discovery and recommendation surfaces have not been publicly assessed for minor-safety harm.

Neutral
4.05

Encryption posture and stated mitigations

Messaging is not end-to-end encrypted by default, so server-side detection remains available.

Pass
4.06

Published child-safety policy with defined enforcement

Policy prohibits the conduct and states termination as the consequence. [1]

Pass

Record

Documented failures, enforcement actions, litigation and investigative reporting bearing on the assessment above.

2023-06

Investigative review of prosecutions referencing the platform

Reporting identified a substantial number of US prosecutions in which the platform was the venue for grooming or distribution, concentrated in private servers and direct messages. [2]

2024-11

State enforcement action over minor-safety representations

A state attorney general opened action concerning the gap between the operator's public safety representations and the protections actually applied to minor accounts. [4]

Sources

  1. [1]
  2. [2]
  3. [3]
    CyberTipline Data

    NCMEC · 2025

  4. [4]
    State attorney general enforcement filing

    Illustrative placeholder · 2024-11

Know something we don’t?

If we’ve missed a controversy or there’s newer reporting on Discord, tell us. If you represent Discord, we welcome documentation of safety measures not yet reflected here.

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