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Roblox

roblox.com

D

Deficient

A platform whose user base is substantially composed of children, carrying an in-product economy and open communication. Detection and moderation investment is significant in absolute terms and insufficient relative to the exposure the product design creates.
Domain
roblox.com
Category
Gaming
Last review
2026-04-18

Detection & scanning

Whether known and novel abuse material is found at all, and across which surfaces of the product.

C
1.01

Hash matching on publicly posted media

Uploaded assets pass through automated review before publication. [1]

Pass
1.02

Hash matching on private messages and attachments

Text chat is filtered. Filtering is oriented to blocking terms rather than detecting solicitation patterns. [1]

Neutral
1.03

Classifier detection of previously unseen material

Classifier review is described for uploaded assets, not for in-experience conduct.

Neutral
1.04

Detection applied to live and streamed video

Voice chat moderation is described as automated with sampling. No published detection rate. [1]

Neutral
1.05

Detection of grooming and solicitation in text

Solicitation detection exists but is routinely defeated by moving the conversation to another platform, which is the documented pattern. [2]

Neutral
1.06

Participation in industry hash-sharing programmes

Participates in industry hash-sharing arrangements.

Pass

Reporting & transparency

What the operator tells NCMEC, law enforcement and the public, and whether those disclosures can be checked.

C
2.01

Files CyberTipline reports to NCMEC

Files CyberTipline reports. [3]

Pass
2.02

Publishes child-safety enforcement figures

Publishes a transparency report including child-safety categories. [1]

Pass
2.03

Report quality sufficient for investigation

Not assessed.

Neutral
2.04

Reporting cadence and timeliness

Not assessed.

Neutral

Response & enforcement

What happens after material is found: how fast it comes down, what happens to the account, and whether the decision can be contested.

D
3.01

Time to removal of confirmed material

No published latency figure.

Neutral
3.02

Account termination on confirmed violation

Termination is the stated consequence.

Pass
3.03

Prevention of re-registration

Re-registration is trivial and is documented in reporting as routine among banned adults. [2]

Fail
3.04

Preservation of evidence

Preservation on request described.

Neutral
3.05

Escalation of imminent-harm cases

An escalation path for imminent harm is described.

Pass

Product & policy posture

The design decisions that determine how much abuse is possible in the first place, before any detection is applied.

D
4.01

Protective defaults for minor accounts

Under-13 accounts carry restricted chat by default. Restrictions are keyed to a self-declared age. [1]

Neutral
4.02

Restrictions on adult-initiated contact with minors

Adults and minors share experiences and communication surfaces by default. This is the central product decision and it has not changed. [2] [4]

Fail
4.03

Age assurance at registration

Age estimation is offered for some features and is not required at registration.

Neutral
4.04

Recommendation systems assessed for minor-safety harm

Experience discovery has not been publicly assessed for whether it surfaces experiences built to attract and isolate minors. [4]

Fail
4.05

Encryption posture and stated mitigations

Communication is not end-to-end encrypted; server-side detection is available.

Pass
4.06

Published child-safety policy with defined enforcement

Community standards are published with stated consequences.

Pass

Record

Documented failures, enforcement actions, litigation and investigative reporting bearing on the assessment above.

2024-10

Investigative reporting on predation in-product

Reporting documented a pattern in which adults contacted minors inside experiences and moved the conversation to external messaging platforms, and identified prosecutions following that pattern. [2]

2025-08

State civil actions filed

Multiple state attorneys general filed actions alleging that the product's design facilitated adult contact with minors and that the operator's safety representations were misleading. [4]

Sources

  1. [1]
  2. [2]
  3. [3]
    CyberTipline Data

    NCMEC · 2025

  4. [4]
    State attorney general complaints

    Illustrative placeholder · 2025-08

Know something we don’t?

If we’ve missed a controversy or there’s newer reporting on Roblox, tell us. If you represent Roblox, we welcome documentation of safety measures not yet reflected here.

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